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We analyse the integration of wheat markets across 18 towns in the Austrian Low
Countries during the second half of the 18
th century and the relationship with the
rapidly expanding paved road network in this period.  We use a switching
regression approach (threshold cointegration) to study long-run and short-run
integration of these markets, using monthly wheat prices.  We find that
throughout this period, markets were spatially interconnected.  However, price
margins adjust only slowly to long-term levels in response to local shocks.  We
also find that transaction costs are relatively high.  The results suggest a complex
market with regular trade flow reversals and periods of unprofitable trade
between key markets.  It is widely accepted in Belgian historiography that the
construction of a paved road network caused a substantial reduction in
transaction costs.  Our research, however, indicates that distance, fixed costs or
links by rivers and canals mainly influenced transaction costs, not the expansion
of a paved road network.  Two factors can account for this.  First, the toll
structure on paved roads discouraged bulk trade.  Secondly, new private
investment in inter-city grain trade that may have led to cuts in the trading costs,
typically appeared to be absent in this period.  However, adjustment speeds in
markets are significantly affected by the existence of paved roads.  Better
communication and faster transport due to the road network resulted in faster
arbitrage.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The integration of commodity markets has become a hot topic in the economic history
literature of the 1990s.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the Twelfth International
Economic History Congress, organised in Madrid in 1998, devoted a separate session to
the subject (Nunez (1998))
1
.  Especially the integration of food markets attracts a lot of
attention from researchers.  It is easy to understand why.  As a local market becomes more
closely linked with its neighbours, the potential food supply zone of that local market will
increase substantially.  Consequently, local harvest conditions will exert less influence on
local prices in an integrated market system.  A local harvest failure, for instance, will lead
to less upward pressure on local prices, as the price differential with neighbouring markets
will soon trigger off an inflow of food from these markets.  It is precisely the possibility for
high-price areas to import food from low-price areas that reduces price volatility in well-
integrated markets (Gibson and Smout (1995)).  As such, the process of market integration
diminishes the risk of local or regional famines.  More in general, it reduces uncertainty for
both consumers and producers of food, which improves the quality of life and favours
economic development.
Not only the important positive effects of market integration explains the current attention
for the subject.  Since the 1980s the methods to analyse the behaviour of markets have
changed dramatically.  Financial theory gave the initial impetus by developing a new
framework to investigate the performance of stock markets.  Soon, however, it became
clear that these techniques could also be used to scrutinise commodity markets.  In
conjunction with the spectacular breakthroughs in computing power, cliometricians did not
hesitate to apply these new tools to economic history
2
.
Initially, Belgian historiography remained untouched by these developments
3
, but in the
late 1990s things started to change.  Especially the second half of the 18
th century received
much attention (Buyst, Dercon and Van Campenhout (1998), Dercon and Van
Campenhout (1998), Van Campenhout (1998)).  Why?
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The various contributions to this book also provide a rich bibliography.
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Examples are Ejrnaes and Persson (1997) and Grennes and Goodwin (1998).
3
Of course, we do not claim that research on market integration in the Austrian Low Countries only
started in the late 1990s.  We refer e.g. to Van der Wee (1963) and Vandenbroeke (1972).  We merely
argue that their analysis did not go beyond the use of correlation coefficients.  As we know today, the
use of correlation coefficients can generate highly misleading results.2
The second half of the 18
th century is a crucial period of change in the development of the
economy in the Austrian Low Countries.  Population growth soared and per capita income
did gradually increase, causing a steep rise in domestic food demand.  Nevertheless, the
Austrian Low Countries managed to export grain during most of the period under
consideration.  This indicates that grain production expanded rapidly in the second half of
the 18th century.  Crop yields reached top levels compared with other continental
European areas when improved techniques allowed fallow to disappear in the crop rotation
system (Vandenbroeke (1975), Van Zanden (1993)).  Second, an impressive network of
paved roads was built in the Austrian Low Countries during the 18th century.  It has been
suggested that this caused a substantial reduction in transaction costs.
The absence of transport prices impedes us to quantify the beneficial effects of road
construction on trade, but Blondé (1995) advances the following qualitative arguments to
stress their importance.  A first advantage is that fewer horses could transport heavier
freights over longer distances.  This generated serious cost reductions as the maintenance
of horses accounted for approximately half of total transportation costs.  Second, the
reliability of transport services improved substantially since it became less dependent on
weather conditions.  Rainfall and light snow slowed down transport on paved roads, but
usually did not make it impossible anymore as was often the case on dirt roads.
Consequently, overland transport could continue during winter, so that the sector’s heavy
fixed costs - maintenance of horses and carriages - could be distributed over more rides.
Third, road transport became faster despite the appearance of many tollhouses along paved
roads.
Due to lack of data it is impossible to test these arguments directly.  Therefore, we use an
indirect approach.  Using price data of an important commodity traded in many cities, e.g.
wheat, we ask whether the development of paved roads contributed to the creation of a
national market, i.e. a system of spatially interlinked markets across the territory.  Do we
observe a decline in transaction costs when moving wheat around the country during the
second half of the 18
th century?  Was there a change in the speed of arbitrage among wheat
markets?
In analysing the issue of market integration, we apply recent methodological
considerations and econometric techniques from the booming literature on spatial price
analysis in agricultural economics.  For an overview see Fackler and Goodwin (1999).  In
particular, we build on recent time series techniques for the analysis of co-movement of
non-stationary series (cointegration) and the implied dynamic adjustment processes (error-3
correction).  However, the standard way of applying these techniques to commodity
markets assumes continuous, unidirectional trade.  This is unlikely to be realistic in a
relatively small area with several important markets, which may be supplied by a variety of
sources from different directions.  As a consequence, there may be regular periods of
absent trade on certain routes.  Depending on local conditions, trade flows may change as
well.  A standard, single-equation dynamic error-correction model cannot handle this
phenomenon.  To implement this analysis, we use a switching error-correction regression
approach using threshold cointegration (Taylor and Obstfeld (1998), Taylor and Prakash
(1998)).  In section 2 we give the data sources and in section 3 we present the general
context.  Section 4 explains the econometric methodology and section 5 gives the results.
Section 6 presents some sensitivity analysis and section 7 gives the interpretation of our
findings.
2.  SOURCES
To answer the questions mentioned above, it is clear that we need detailed and accurate
price data that reflect real market conditions.  Since the late Middle Ages many city
governments in the Southern Low Countries collected price data to monitor the local food
situation.  Most of these figures have been published as annual averages.  Since we want to
measure the speed at which markets responded to each other we need at least monthly data.
Unfortunately, the number of cities for which monthly price data have been published is
fairly limited.  Moreover, the way these price series were constructed varied strongly from
researcher to researcher.  For some cities the author noted down the price observed during
the first market day of the month.  In other instances a monthly average was calculated
after leaving out the highest and lowest value registered during that month.  In still other
cases the opposite procedure was followed: the author took the average of the highest and
lowest price observed during that month.  Sometimes we just do not know what procedure
was used
4
.  Given the volatile character of food prices comparing such figures can lead to
highly misleading results.
Fortunately, there is a source available that circumvents most of these problems.  Its
emergence is related to a fundamental change in the economic policy of the Austrian Low
Countries’ central government.  Until the mid-18
th century the central government’s food
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From another point of view, Van der Wee was also very dissatisfied of the quality of the series
published.  See his book review of C.  Verlinden (1959), in Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en
Geschiedenis, vol.  39 (1961), pp.  942-944.4
policy was dominated by ad hoc crisis management in the case of acute shortages
5
.
Influenced by mercantilist ideas it was replaced in the late 1750s by a constant concern of
organising efficient food supplies (Materne (1994)).  In addition, the central government
aimed at pursuing a more differentiated grain policy.  Until the mid-18
th century export
prohibitions had a general character.  Thereafter, they became restricted to certain grain
products and to certain areas (Vandenbroeke (1967)).  All this necessitated a close
monitoring of fluctuations in local grain prices.  Therefore, the central government decided
to establish its own information network.
From 1765 to 1794 customs officials registered market prices in a standardised way in
more than twenty cities.  Specialised civil servants supervised the whole operation and
compared the obtained figures with the weekly price lists collected by the city
governments.  As the various city administrations used their own measurement systems,
these specialised civil servants had to convert the price data in a common measurement
unit, e.g. in Brabantine stuivers per razier from Brussels
6
.  Finally, these data were used as
an input to produce detailed reports on the Austrian Low Countries’ food situation
(Materne (1994)).  Vandenbroeke (1973) published a considerable part of these data.  For
various agricultural products he noted down the prices observed during the first market day
of the month.  So, the time of price registration was the same for all markets under
consideration.
We limit our research to wheat prices, as this commodity was by far the most traded grain
product in the Austrian Low Countries
7
.  Moreover, wheat has a higher value/weight ratio
than rye, so that the profits from arbitrage are likely to be substantial.  We selected
eighteen markets for which close to all 360 monthly observations are available (see Table
1).  A comparison with early 19
th-century turnover data tells us that the eighteen recorded
cities compose a representative sample of all large and medium-sized grain markets in the
Austrian Low Countries.  The only drawback is that Limburg and Luxembourg are not
represented in the sample.  Agriculture in these regions was not well developed, so that
subsistence farming dominated the picture (Dejongh (2000)).  Absence of important wheat
markets was the obvious result.
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For a general assessment in a European context, see Persson (1996, 1999).
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A razier from Brussels is 49 litres.
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We do not know the sales volumes of grain during the second half of the 18
th century.  In 1813 the sales
volume of wheat on “Belgian” markets amounted to 731,000 hectolitres compared to 492,000
hectolitres for rye.  We have no reasons to believe that these proportions were substantially different in
the preceding decades.  (We thank Dr M.  Goossens for providing us these data which are based on
Archives Nationales, Paris, F
11843).5
3. GENERAL CONTEXT
Table 1 provides details on the size of these markets.  Even though the data are from 1813,
it seems unlikely that the order and relative importance had changed dramatically since the
late 18
th century.  Leuven was undoubtedly the most important wheat market of the
Austrian Low Countries.  It was located in the middle of rich agricultural areas that were
linked to the city by a network of canals and paved roads.  Moreover, Leuven was an
important centre of beer breweries consuming large quantities of grain.  Charleroi, in
second position, benefited from its location on the edges of the rich farmlands of Hainaut
and Walloon Brabant.  Moreover, the strong expansion of coal mining and iron making in
the area created a large demand for wheat.  The Brussels wheat market occupied a strong
third position.  Being the capital of the Austrian Low Countries the city counted many
high-income earners, e.g. top civil servants, lawyers, and traders.




















Source: Data from the Archives Nationales, Paris, F
11843 (see footnote 8)
Looking at the evolution of wheat prices between 1765 and 1794 we notice a remarkable
stability (for Brussels, see Figure I).  The only real exception is 1789 a result of crop
failure and mounting political tensions.  Both elements would eventually lead to the so-6
called Brabantine Revolution, which gave large parts of the Austrian Low Countries a
short-lived independence (October 1789 - October 1790).  The turmoil clearly resulted in
an increased volatility of wheat prices.  Another, but much smaller blip in wheat prices is

















Figure I: Wheat prices in Brussels, 1765-1794 (in Brabantine stuivers per razier from
Brussels)
To introduce price differences between markets, we focus on two large markets located
close to each other, Leuven and Brussels.  The latter being a centre of high income earners,
it is not surprising that wheat prices were somewhat higher in the capital of the Austrian
Low Countries than in Leuven.  Figure II shows that the price relationship between the two
cities was relatively stable in the long run, which suggests that arbitrage between these
well-established markets may have taken place.  Stability is clearly interrupted in the early
1790s and the series afterwards may be too small to check the persistence of the earlier
patterns.7
An important feature is that at times the margins between these two markets become close
to zero or even negative.  This suggests that in certain seasons, no profitable trade was
possible from Leuven to Brussels or even that trade flows, if present, would have been
from Brussels to Leuven.  This is a feature that complicates the econometric analysis of
market integration, as will be discussed below.
Other markets display similar features.  For example, Figure III gives the price differential
between Brussels and Ghent.  As Ghent was located in a typically rye producing era, wheat
prices in Ghent were higher than in the capital of the Austrian Low Countries (Dejongh
(2000)).  So, grain is usually flowing from Brussels to Ghent in this period.  Margins
appear to be fluctuating, but from the mid-1770s they settle on some more persistent level.
Fluctuations sometimes result in very small or negative margins, also suggesting the


































Figure III: First differences of wheat prices in Brussels and Ghent, 1765-17949
As indicated before, various authors have stressed the importance of the construction of a
network of paved roads as a crucial determinant of market integration in the Austrian Low
Countries.  How did the network develop in the 18th century?  Before 1704 most paved
roads remained limited to small and incoherent stretches around large cities.  For strategic
reasons a systematic network of paved roads was built during the Spanish War of
Succession that linked Brussels with other important cities, such as Antwerp, Ghent,
Leuven and Bergen (Map 1).  After the Peace of Utrecht (1713) the central government
lost its interest in the construction of paved roads, but the initiative was soon taken over by
regional and local authorities.
Around the middle of the 18
th century the central government’s interest in infrastructure
revived again.  Moreover, this policy was put into a much broader economic perspective:
the Austrian Low Countries should take over a part of Holland’s profitable transit trade to
Liège and the Rhineland.  Investments in the port of Ostend and in the construction of an
integrated network of waterways and paved roads played a key role in this plan.  By 1763
the road network connected most of the main towns (see map 2) and a decade later the
east-west project was realised
8
.  Blondé (1995) has demonstrated that it proved to be a
highly successful strategy in attracting transit trade.  Of course, domestic trade also
benefited substantially from the improved infrastructure network.  By the end of the period
(1793, map 3) provincial roads expanded, so that the Austrian Low Countries had obtained
the highest paved road density in Europe (Genicot (1946)).
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For more details, see, e.g., Thewes (1994), Genicot (1939 and 1946), Urbain (1939).10
Map 1: Paved road network in 1718
Map 2: Paved Road Network in 176311
Map 3: Paved Road Network in 1793
4. DATA ANALYSIS METHOD
In the analysis, we can only rely on price data and on some information about the
extension of the paved road network.  First, we will try to exploit the price information to
address two questions.  (1) Can we detect evidence that markets are integrated? (2) How
fast is this adjustment occurring? Then, we will try to link the results from the econometric
analysis to the road network evolution in the 18
th century.  In particular, we will investigate
whether the presence and development of paved roads can explain our estimates of
transaction costs and of arbitrage speed between markets.
The fact that only price information is available limits the methodological possibilities to
analyse market integration.  In line with other studies, statistical properties of the
relationship between prices in different markets can then tentatively be interpreted as
evidence of actual linkages between these markets.  Under certain conditions, the existence
of a long-run relationship between prices of different markets can be tested, providing
evidence of integration between these markets in the long run.  Furthermore, dynamic12
equations can then be derived, specifying the dynamic processes leading from short-run
disequilibria to the long-run equilibrium.  Applying this model to the situation described
above in 18
th century wheat markets is problematic.  The reason is the recurrence of very
low or even negative margins.  This suggests that at times, no profitable trade is possible or




t C  be the transactions cost of moving grain between markets i and j in
period t.  Let 
i
t P  be the p rice of grain in market i.  Efficient spatial arbitrage (Takayama
and Judge (1971)) requires then that there are unexploited profits from trade between






t C P P £ - (1)
Non-zero trade flows under efficient arbitrage would imply equality of both sides in (1).
Efficient arbitrage could imply flows from i to j and from j to i, depending on market
conditions in i and j.  When (1) is valid with equality, prices are said to be at the parity
bound.  If margins are larger than the parity bounds, profitable trade could take place.
Strict inequality of (1) would require zero trade flows.  As in Ravallion (1987), if (1) is
valid, then the two spatially separated markets will be referred to as integrated.  A weaker
form of market integration could be defined as requiring (1) only to be valid in the long
run: deviations could occur in the short run, but arbitrage would in due course return the
market to satisfy (1).
There have been different approaches to develop this into a statistical model of market
integration.  Cointegration models only use price data and test whether in the long run
there is a particular stable relationship between prices in i and j.  Note that for these models
to be consistent with the efficient arbitrage model, they require continuous trade and no
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Stationarity of ht implies the existence of a long-run relationship between prices: they
move together.  Implicit in the model, trade is taking place continuously and in one
direction only.  Errors are made, however, and they are corrected over some period of time.
The Engle-Granger results imply the existence of an error-correction representation that
models this correction process over time.  Testing restrictions on this error-correction13
model allows inference about the speed of adjustment to this long-run relationship
(Palaskas and Harriss-White (1993), Alexander and Wyeth (1994), Goodwin and
Schroeder (1987)).  However, it is clearly only a limiting case of the efficient arbitrage
condition in (1), excluding situations in which no profitable trade can take place and
markets in which conditions change sufficiently to allow a reversal of the trade flow.  In
recent years, threshold cointegration models have been developed to deal with these
situations and applied to market integration (Balke and Fomby (1997), Prakash and Taylor
(1997), Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Goodwin and Grennes (1998)).
Suppose that, as is usually the case, (real) prices in market j and i are non-stationary.
Suppose further that real transfer costs to move grain between markets i and j are equal to
C
ij in each direction, and constant over time.  To derive an alternative model that could
address some of the shortcomings of other approaches, let us define the margin between
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Suppose that for the time being we have no information about trade flows nor about






t C m C m , C m £ - < > and .  The last regime corresponds to (1), the condition
for efficient spatial arbitrage, and consists of both situations in which trade occurs and
arbitrage is efficient, and situations in which no profitable trade occurs.  In the first
(second) regime, market traders have not exploited profitable trade opportunities, in
moving grain from i to j (j to i).
If arbitrage takes place, however slowly, then mt would in the long run be a process
returning to a band [ ]
ij ij C , C - .   Arbitrage will only happen outside this band until the
threshold values on the band are reached.  Even though mt does not return to a particular
equilibrium level but a to a band, mt is a stationary process (Balke and Fomby (1997)).  A
threshold cointegration model and in particular the Band-Threshold Autoregression Model
(Band-TAR) provides a reasonable way to characterise the behaviour of the actual margin
mt (Prakash and Taylor (1997), Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Balke and Fomby (1997)).  A
version of the model can be specified as follows.  Inside the parity bounds, when arbitrage
is efficient, there is no arbitrage and the price gap shows no central tendency.  When
outside the parity bounds, arbitrage takes place and, just as in PPP or error correction
models, there will be some non-linear autoregressive process to return to the long run band,14
and the size of the adjustment is a percentage of the deviation in each period.  Formally,























































where the errors are white noise, i.e. 
out
t n  is i.i.d. ( )
in
t out , h s and 0
2  and 
in
t h  is i.i.d. ( )
2 0 in ,s ; 
r is the speed of adjustment of mt towards the band [ ]
ij ij C , C -
9
.  The value of r is
expected to be in the half open interval ]0, -1]
10
.  Inside the band, there is no adjustment:
the margin follows a random walk.  Note that in this model, even though mt is globally
stationary, locally, i.e. inside the band, it displays unit root behaviour.
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Inside the band, there is no systematic dynamic relationship between changes in prices in
each market.  However, outside the band, error-correction behaviour can be observed.
Changes in one market are only passed on with error to the other market, but there is a
process of correction: in each period, part of the error is corrected.  Similar to previous
error-correction model based analysis for market integration, a natural measure of how
well markets are integrated for given transfer costs and given the existence of a long-run
(band) equilibrium, is the speed of adjustment r: the closer to minus one, the better
markets are integrated.
Equations (4) and (5) also show very clearly the subtle relationship between cointegration
and spatial price arbitrage.  If spatial arbitrage takes place, unit root behaviour in price
margins should be observed.  This regime includes margins up to and including the parity
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The model could be easily generalised by allowing for further lags in m and by allowing r and h
out to be
different depending on whether mt-1 > C
ij or mt-1< -C
ij.  The estimation technique remains unchanged.
10
r is expected to be zero if C
ij is sufficiently large not to allow ever any trade to take place or if never
any scope for profitable arbitrage can be observed.  In general, if the markets are not connected for
whatever reason (market imperfections or high transfer costs), then r is expected to be zero.15
bound; only when imperfect arbitrage takes place, we will observe cointegration and the
error-correction formulation to be correct.  The model given is a simple version of the
Band-TAR model.  Balke and Fomby (1997) give extensions in terms of a more
complicated lag-structure, different adjustment speeds depending on the side of the price
band, different threshold structure and other market equilibria.
Even though locally the margin in this model is non-stationary, overall it is stationary,
provided r is non-zero.  Of course, stationarity will need to be tested.  Balke and Fomby
(1997) use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate the power of a large number of tests and
find that standard tests for cointegration, such the ADF or the Phillips-Perron tests still
have reasonably high power, even if the true model is a TAR
11
.  Stationarity of the margin
is evidence of interconnectedness: at least in the long-run the markets are integrated.
Once stationarity of the margin is established, one can proceed with the estimation of the
Band-TAR model.  The strategy is to estimate the model using a grid search over different
possible values for the threshold.  The basic tool is an arranged autoregression.  In our
application, this orders the data according to the values of Dmt rather than by time.  Note,
however, that the dynamic relationship between mt and its lags is retained; only the order
of the observations is different.  The sample is then partitioned is two sub-samples, one
with all observations inside the band and one with all the observations outside the band.
Next, one has to choose a criterion, either to maximise the likelihood function of the TAR
model (as in Prakash (1996), in Prakash and Taylor (1997) and in Obstfeld and Taylor
(1997)), or to maximise the sum of the residual sum of squared errors in each of the sub-
samples (Balke and Fomby (1997)).  Given the piece-wise linearity of the model outside
the band and the unit root behaviour inside the band, either method is efficient and
equivalent.  These procedures return (super-consistent) estimates of the threshold (C
ij)
(Chan (1993)) and the adjustment speed.
The estimated threshold provides an estimate of the margin used in trade.  Its significance
and a confidence interval is not straightforwardly derived, since the parameter space is
truncated at zero (i.e. the threshold is not defined for non-positive values).  Non-standard
distributions could be derived using Monte Carlo simulations.  Measures of the degree of
market integration are straightforwardly derived from the analysis.  The estimated value of
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The superconsistency results related to estimates of the cointegrating vector can be shown to apply as
well.  Even though no inference is possible on these estimates, in this stage the assumption of constant
additive (i.e. non-proportional) transfer costs as assumed in the model could be looked into, by checking
whether the coefficient on the other price in the cointegrating relationship is close to one (Palaskas and
Harriss-White (1994), Dercon (1995)).16
the adjustment speed r gives the speed with which arbitrage restores equilibrium when
profitable trade opportunities exist.  The closer r to minus one, the faster the adjustment.
If the estimate is statistically not different from minus one, integration can be said to occur
in the short run.  Since both the estimated thresholds and the arbitrage speed are estimated
for a large number of market pairs, we can use these estimates further to look for the
determinants of transactions costs and arbitrage speed across markets, more specifically the
role of roads and distances.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To put the empirical results in perspective, Table 2 gives an overview of some of the key
market relations, mainly neighbouring markets or links between the larger towns
12
.  We
include information on the development of paved roads during the survey period as well as
on whether there is a river or canal network providing a direct link between the towns
13
.
Table 2 shows average margins (in absolute values) between 3 and 10 stuivers per razier
from Brussels over the period.  Distances are typically relative low, but at the beginning of
the 18
th century, many of these key market-pairs were not connected by a paved road:
about half were connected in 1718, while the network had expanded to about 63 percent in
1763 and 78 percent by 1793.  Direct links by water are important but many towns are not
connected in this way.
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In annex we also provide further results of (potentially) more indirectly connected markets.
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In this period, rivers and canals connected directly the following towns: Charleroi-Namen (Samber),
Brussels-Antwerp (canal), Lier-Antwerp (Nete), Leuven-Mechelen (canal), Ath-Doornik (Dender),
Doornik-Gent-Antwerp (Scheldt), Brugge-Ghent (canal), Kortrijk-Ghent (Leie), Veurne-Brugge
(canal), Ieper-Veurne (canal), Lier-Mechelen (Nete), Mechelen-Antwerp (Rupel).17













Ath Doornik 7.1 29 No Yes Yes Yes
Ghent Doornik 9.0 71 No Yes Yes Yes
Kortrijk Doornik 6.4 26 No Yes Yes No
Binche Bergen 4.5 15 No Yes Yes No
Ath Bergen 5.9 19 No Yes Yes No
Brussels Bergen 6.1 52 Yes Yes Yes No
Charleroi Binche 6.8 19 No No No No
Brussels Ath 5.8 43 No No Yes No
Namen Charleroi 4.0 39 No No Yes Yes
Brussels Charleroi 5.3 59 No Yes Yes No
Brussels Namen 5.3 50 No Yes Yes No
Tienen Namen 5.9 45 No No No No
Leuven Namen 4.6 47 No Yes Yes No
Mechelen Brussels 4.3 23 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ghent Brussels 9.8 51 Yes Yes Yes No
Leuven Brussels 3.6 26 Yes Yes Yes No
Leuven Tienen 6.8 20 Yes Yes Yes No
Antwerp Mechelen 4.6 24 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leuven Mechelen 5.9 24 No Yes Yes Yes
Lier Antwerp 7.0 13 Yes Yes Yes Yes
St Niklaas Antwerp 5.0 25 No No No No
Ghent Antwerp 8.9 98 No No No Yes
Brugge Antwerp 7.4 160 No No No Yes
Ghent St Niklaas 9.1 30 No No No No
Brugge Ghent 6.9 62 No No No Yes
Kortrijk Ghent 8.9 45 No Yes Yes Yes
Veurne Brugge 9.5 45 No No Yes Yes
Ieper Brugge 7.7 48 No No Yes No
Kortrijk Brugge 8.3 46 No Yes Yes No
Kortrijk Ieper 6.2 25 No Yes Yes No
  * stuiver per razier from Brussels
To conduct the threshold cointegration analysis on the price series of these market pairs,
we need to conduct first non-stationarity tests on the series.  In Annex Table 1, we find that
the series are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in first differences, as expected.
Cointegration tests were conducted, as test for long-run co-movement of the price series.
These tests (Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests with 12 lags) are reported in
Table 3.  We find that for all market pairs tested, the null of no cointegration is rejected at
1 percent for all but two markets, were it is rejected at 5 percent
14
.  In short, cointegration
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The null states that there is unit root behaviour in the error term of the cointegrating relationship, or
equivalently, there is no cointegration.  If the null is rejected, we have cointegration.  So, we reject the
null of no cointegration for all market pairs on a 1 percent level, except for two pairs, where we can
reject “only” at 5 percent.18
is present, so that in the long-run all these markets are connected.  Note that this is the case
despite the absence of roads for a number of market pairs.  When extending the analysis to
other markets, which are only indirectly linked, we find the same result.  Indeed, for 99
percent of all possible combinations of price differentials, we find stationarity of the errors
in the cointegrating relationship.  In Annex Table 2, we give some of the results.  An
alternative test involves looking at stationarity of the difference between prices in different
markets.  Implicitly, this is imposing the restriction on the cointegrating vector that the
coefficient on the price at the right hand side is equal to one.  Annex Table 3 gives the
results for the key markets.  Virtually all margins are stationary at least at 10 percent.
Table 3: Cointegration tests as tests for long-run market integration
Market Pairs: DF ADF(12)
Ath Doornik -7.69 ** -3.17 **
Ghent Doornik -9.15 ** -3.65 **
Kortrijk Doornik -9.97 ** -4.57 **
Binche Bergen -9.70 ** -2.82 **
Ath Bergen -7.76 ** -2.36 *
Brussels Bergen -8.70 ** -4.37 **
Charleroi Binche -11.45 ** -3.80 **
Brussels Ath -8.07 ** -4.64 **
Namen Charleroi -11.65 ** -3.81 **
Brussels Charleroi -11.75 ** -5.74 **
Brussels Namen -10.56 ** -4.73 **
Tienen Namen -8.76 ** -4.29 **
Leuven Namen -10.85 ** -3.73 **
Mechelen Brussels -9.30 ** -4.80 **
Ghent Brussels -7.12 ** -3.54 **
Leuven Brussels -11.40 ** -4.22 **
Leuven Tienen -10.43 ** -4.30 **
Antwerp Mechelen -7.63 ** -4.21 **
Leuven Mechelen -9.80 ** -4.31 **
Lier Antwerp -6.67 ** -3.43 **
St Niklaas Antwerp -7.27 ** -3.83 **
Ghent Antwerp -9.04 ** -3.55 **
Brugge Antwerp -6.12 ** -2.59 *
Ghent St Niklaas -7.88 ** -3.63 **
Brugge Ghent -7.02 ** -2.62 **
Kortrijk Ghent -7.95 ** -4.19 **
Veurne Brugge -8.07 ** -3.61 **
Ieper Brugge -5.56 ** -3.59 **
Kortrijk Brugge -6.47 ** -2.94 **
Kortrijk Ieper -7.60 ** -3.64 **
Note:  1 percent critical value is -2.60 (**)
5 percent critical value is -1.95 (*)19
The fact that the significance of the test-statistic is typically lower than the one obtained
using a unrestricted cointegrating vector may suggest that in some cases the coefficient on
prices is not equal to one.  Inference on the cointegrating vector is not possible, but in most
cases we find a coefficient on the market price on the right hand side to be relatively close
to one, justifying the specification of a dynamic model in margins as in (5).  Given the
possibility of regular trade reversals, we present a Threshold Cointegration model, using
the margins as the cointegrating relationship in Table 4.  We give the estimated threshold,
which is our best estimate of transaction costs and the coefficient on the error-correction
term (lagged margin in (5)), which gives an indicator of the adjustment speed to long-run
equilibrium.  Recall that a fast and immediate correction would require a coefficient of
minus one, i.e. all errors are immediately corrected and ‘short-run integration’ is present.
We include therefore a test on the null hypothesis of short-run integration.  For
comparison, we also give the results on a simple error-correction model (in particular an
AR(1) model on the margins), which would be the true model if thresholds did not matter,
i.e. if we did not worry about trade reversal and the absence of trade in some periods.
Inference on the thresholds is complicated since non-positive values are not defined so that
test-statistics follow non-standard distributions.  However, we can immediately test the
null of short-run integration.  It appears that despite typically higher adjustment speeds
than if we misspecified the model to exclude periods of non-profitable trade or trade
reversal, only in two markets do we find that the null of short-run integration cannot be
rejected (Ath-Doornik and Brussels-Charleroi).  In short, even though the data are only
monthly, the data do not support a hypothesis of fast and immediate corrections (within
one month) to deviations from the long-run equilibrium.  In other words, adjustment is
sluggish.  Considering other market pairs, which are only indirectly linked, confirms these
estimates (Annex Table 3).  Virtually no markets can be found with immediate adjustment
of deviations from the long-run margins, i.e. short-run integration is not present.20
Table 4: Dynamic adjustment model and short run integration


















Ath Doornik 10.70 -1.01 -8.30 ** -0.08 -0.29 -7.82 ** 19.23 **
Ghent Doornik 4.00 -0.42 -7.93 ** 10.95 ** -0.29 -7.79 ** 19.09 **
Kortrijk Doornik 1.40 -0.51 -10.18 ** 9.78 ** -0.45 -10.19 ** 12.43 **
Binche Bergen 1.20 -0.46 -9.00 ** 10.57 ** -0.40 -9.41 ** 14.31 **
Ath Bergen 3.20 -0.37 -7.24 ** 12.33 ** -0.25 -7.21 ** 21.22 **
Brussels Bergen 8.50 -0.51 -5.67 ** 5.45 ** -0.20 -6.23 ** 24.41 **
Charleroi Binche 5.30 -0.60 -9.31 ** 6.21 ** -0.29 -7.79 ** 19.01 **
Brussels Ath 2.60 -0.34 -7.01 ** 13.61 ** -0.25 -7.08 ** 21.79 **
Namen Charleroi 0.51 -0.57 -11.05 ** 8.34 ** -0.53 -11.39 ** 9.95 **
Brussels Charleroi 5.90 -1.05 -12.43 ** -0.59 -0.40 -9.51 ** 14.53 **
Brussels Namen 5.10 -0.67 -7.87 ** 3.88 ** -0.28 -7.82 ** 19.86 **
Tienen Namen 2.00 -0.23 -5.90 ** 19.75 ** -0.19 -6.10 ** 26.41 **
Leuven Namen 3.60 -0.76 -9.43 ** 2.98 ** -0.46 -9.62 ** 11.28 **
Mechelen Brussels 0.50 -0.37 -8.51 ** 14.49 ** -0.34 -8.63 ** 16.53 **
Ghent Brussels 13.00 -0.37 -4.81 ** 8.19 ** -0.09 -4.21 ** 40.61 **
Leuven Brussels 2.91 -0.83 -10.29 ** 2.11 * -0.52 -10.44 ** 9.49 **
Leuven Tienen 7.19 -0.59 -7.01 ** 4.87 ** -0.23 -6.26 ** 21.28 **
Antwerp Mechelen 1.00 -0.31 -7.22 ** 16.07 ** -0.28 -7.55 ** 19.79 **
Leuven Mechelen 3.50 -0.54 -7.65 ** 6.52 ** -0.33 -7.80 ** 15.90 **
Lier Antwerp 4.53 -0.29 -5.74 ** 14.05 ** -0.16 -5.53 ** 29.40 **
St Niklaas Antwerp 1.00 -0.30 -6.94 ** 16.19 ** -0.27 -7.41 ** 20.39 **
Ghent Antwerp 7.72 -0.38 -6.52 ** 10.64 ** -0.16 -5.56 ** 30.00 **
Brugge Antwerp 1.00 -0.15 -4.90 ** 27.77 ** -0.14 -5.17 ** 31.88 **
Ghent St Niklaas 5.60 -0.24 -5.37 ** 17.01 ** -0.15 -5.43 ** 30.27 **
Brugge Ghent 8.00 -0.57 -7.06 ** 5.33 ** -0.23 -6.84 ** 22.92 **
Kortrijk Ghent 4.60 -0.27 -6.25 ** 16.90 ** -0.18 -6.03 ** 26.72 **
Veurne Brugge 7.91 -0.34 -6.14 ** 11.92 ** -0.15 -5.21 ** 30.57 **
Ieper Brugge 2.30 -0.18 -5.24 ** 23.87 ** -0.14 -5.24 ** 31.10 **
Kortrijk Brugge 9.10 -0.48 -7.85 ** 8.50 ** -0.19 -6.11 ** 26.27 **
Kortrijk Ieper 1.00 -0.32 -7.86 ** 16.70 ** -0.29 -7.85 ** 18.81 **
** = significant at 1 percent
  * = significant at 5 percent21
Table 5 illustrates this further.  For these key markets, we give the half life implied by the
estimates, i.e. the time that is needed for a variable to return to half its initial value - a
measure of how fast errors are corrected
15
.  For comparison, we also give the half-life
implied by the simple error-correction model.  Typically, half-lives are relatively
substantial.  On average about 1.4 months (i.e. about 42 days) are needed to correct half the
error, although the range is up to 4 months, according to our point estimates.






















St Niklaas Antwerp 1.94
Ghent Antwerp 1.45
Brugge Antwerp 4.27







A half life is the solution for T in x(t+T)=x(t)/2.  It can be shown that
T=ln(1/2)/ln(b), with b=1+Dx(t)/x(t-1), or in our case, b=1+r.  If r is -0.5, then
T is one, so it takes one month to correct half the shock.  In the limit, when r
approaches -1, any error in t-1 is fully corrected in t.
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The analysis also generated information on trade opportunities that are left unexploited to
some extent in each period.  In particular, we have estimated how often a market pair is
located in one of the three regimes specified in equation (5): (a) no trade possible due to
margins below transactions costs, (b) potential trade from the first market to the other,
since the current price margins appears to be exceeding current transactions costs, and (c)
the reverse situation expressing unexploited profits via a trade reversal, since profitable
trade could take place from the second to the first market (margins larger than transactions
costs).  Table 6 reports the estimated situation in the wheat markets of the Austrian Low
Countries in this period.  First note, that for many markets incentives appear to have
existed for trade flow reversals, i.e. potential trade has occurred in both directions at
different times in this period.  For very few markets the direction of trade remained
unchanged most of the time.  This is evidence of a complex and probably quite active grain
market in this area, despite the fact that immediate adjustment to long-run margins does
not take place.  Also, transactions costs appear at times too high for trade between the
markets, presumably because supplies from other areas make the trade relationship not
profitable; for some markets this is quite regularly so.  Unfortunately, one would need
trade flow data to be able to confirm this interpretation, which are currently unavailable.
Nevertheless, in the Austrian Low Countries, there is a long history of fairly intense grain
trade between different towns at least since medieval times, with small or larger quantities
being moved around (Van der Wee (1963)).  At the same time, wheat is a bulky, relatively
low value commodity, so transactions costs in moving grain are relatively high in relation
to its value, so that large margins will be needed to induce trade.
To conclude, we find evidence of an integrated market, at least in the long run.  Arbitrage
to bring margins in line with long-run levels is relatively slow.  Nevertheless, the evidence
suggests a complex market with periods of changing trade flows of wheat, resulting in
some trading routes losing profitability from time to time.23
Table 6: Direction of trade opportunities implied by regressions







from (2) to (1)
Ath Doornik 14 73 13
Ghent Doornik 15 28 57
Kortrijk Doornik 46 16 38
Binche Bergen 43 22 35
Ath Bergen 35 36 30
Brussels Bergen 24 75 2
Charleroi Binche 52 44 4
Brussels Ath 52 27 20
Namen Charleroi 51 12 37
Brussels Charleroi 8 57 35
Brussels Namen 3 58 39
Tienen Namen 67 26 6
Leuven Namen 11 47 41
Mechelen Brussels 34 11 55
Gent Brussels 0 69 31
Leuven Brussels 39 45 15
Leuven Tienen 1 63 36
Antwerp Mechelen 49 18 34
Leuven Mechelen 53 31 16
Lier Antwerp 14 32 54
St Niklaas Antwerp 41 22 37
Ghent Antwerp 1 45 54
Brugge Antwerp 22 14 64
Ghent St Niklaas 2 40 59
Brugge Ghent 31 59 9
Kortrijk Ghent 60 30 10
Veurne Brugge 55 43 2
Ieper Brugge 59 18 23
Kortrijk Brugge 30 63 7
Kortrijk Ieper 51 13 36
Note: Figures are percentages of observations in the regime.
We now turn to the final part of the analysis: to what extent has the presence and
development of a road network contributed to this extent of market integration? Can our
fairly complicated modelling strategy provide any insight on this issue?  To study this
question, we took the estimated thresholds and the estimated adjustment speeds of all
markets.  We then regressed them onto the actual distances via the existing road network,
the squared distances (to allow for non-linear changes in costs and adjustment speed), a24
dummy describing whether a paved road existed in the beginning of the period under
consideration and a dummy to control for the fact that some towns have links by water,
yielding cost or other advantages in trade.  Recall that the threshold is our best
approximation for transaction costs in wheat markets.  The adjustment speed measures the
speed with which the margins return to long-run equilibrium, presumably due to arbitrage
in the market, when the margins become larger than transaction costs.  To show the value-
added of modelling the markets as a switching regression model, allowing for no trade or
trade reversals, we also did these regressions on the simple (absolute value of the) margin
en the adjustment speed implied by a simple error-correction model.  Since we expect the
latter to be misspecified, (an expectation based on, among others, a visual inspection of the
data series), we can check whether this misspecification would have caused an erroneous
interpretation of the evidence.  We conducted the regression on the ‘key markets’
identified before and on the entire possible data set.  Since in our relatively small area
virtually all markets appear cointegrated, this would appear methodologically acceptable.
Tables 7 and 8 first give the evidence on respectively the margins and on the adjustment
speed r from the basic error-correction model.  In other words, these regressions give the
results based on probably inappropriately taking into account the role of trade flow
reversals and unprofitable trade.  We find that margins are significantly affected by
distances, especially for large distance trade.  This is unsurprising since variable
transaction costs presumably increase with distance.  We cannot detect an effect of the
presence of paved roads or links by rivers or canals.  On the adjustment speed in Table 8,
we notice that for larger distances, adjustment speed is affected by the distance, albeit in a
non-linear way (a decreasing marginal effect for larger distances).
However, using transaction costs and adjustment speed estimates from our threshold
cointegration model, we find some different results.  In Table 9, we notice that estimated
transaction costs increase in distance in a non-linear way, even for the small sample of key
markets.  Again, the presence of roads does not affect transaction costs.  The effect of links
by water is also insignificant, although in some, more restricted formulations, its effect is,
as expected, negative
16
.  However, in terms of adjustment speed, Table 10 shows that roads
do matter and distances are non-significant.  Rivers and canals have no effect on the
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For the full sample, the effect is negative and significant at 20 percent.  If we drop the (insignificant)
road variable and the squared distance variable, the effect of rivers and canals becomes significant at 10
percent.  Since transport by inland waterways is especially useful for bulky commodities, this effect is
in line with expectations.  If we drop the link-by-water variable, the road variable remains insignificant.
In short, some (cost-reducing) effect of the presence of canals and rivers can be detected, but no effect
from paved roads, independent of the exact specification.25
adjustment speed
17
.  Roads increase the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium,
suggesting faster spatial market arbitrage.  The contribution seems especially large on
relatively short distance trade (key markets).  In short, our evidence suggests that paved
roads in the 18
th century did not change the long-run marketing margins between markets,
i.e. they did not appear to cut costs significantly.  However, they encouraged faster market
arbitrage: they cut the length of time needed to erode any short-run deviations from the
long-run margins via spatial trade.
Table 7 Margins
Key markets All market pairs
coef t-value coef t-value
Constant 4.691 3.919 ** 4.295 5.703 **
Road in 1765? -0.292 -0.427 0.179 0.497
Distance in km 0.062 1.784 + 0.071 4.968 **
Distance*distance -0.000 -1.374 -0.000 -3.734 **
River or canal link? 0.467 0.707 -0.393 -0.761
Joint F 1.53 12.38 **
N 29 152
Table 8 Adjustment speed in basic error-correction model
Key markets All market pairs
coef t-value coef. t-value
Constant -0.296 -3.382 ** -0.344 -12.334 **
Road in 1765? -0.047 -1.008 -0.025 -1.751 +
Distance in km 0.001 0.561 0.003 5.102 **
Distance*distance -0.000 -0.117 -0.000 -3.854 **
River or canal link -0.009 -0.021 -0.072 -1.476
Joint F 1.026 13.564 **
N 29 152
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The effect on rivers and canals remains insignificant in all possible formulations attempted.  Dropping
insignificant variables does not reduce change the size and significance of the coefficient of the roads
variable.  This is not a surprise: transport by rivers and canals is typically slow.26
Table 9 Estimated thresholds
Key markets All market pairs
coef t-value coef t-value
Constant -0.919 -0.414 2.345 1.191
Road in 1765? 1.279 1.009 1.065 1.134
Distance in km 0.166 2.607 * 0.068 1.825 +
Distance*distance -0.000 -2.458 * -0.000 -1.430
River or canal link? 0.008 0.065 -1.907 -1.412
Joint F 1.81 2.51 *
N 29 152
Table 10 Adjustment speed in threshold cointegration model
Key markets All market pairs
coef t-value coef t-value
Constant -0.233 -1.532 -0.529 -5.388 **
Road in 1765? -0.176 -2.036 * -0.080 -1.711 +
Distance in km -0.005 -1.225 0.002 1.219
Distance*distance 0.000 1.340 -0.000 -0.612
River or canal link? 0.027 0.318 0.070 1.037
Joint F 1.73 2.94 *
N 29 152
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
To convince ourselves about the robustness of our results, we performed a further series of
regressions.  First, from a visual inspection of Figures I, II and III and the other underlying
data series, it is clear that at the end of the period considered, the data become unstable.
Indeed, it is a period of substantial political and social instability, first with the Brabantine
Revolution (1789-1790) against the Austrian authorities, followed by the consequences of
the French Revolution spilling over into the Austrian Low Countries from 1792.  Indeed, in
earlier analysis (Buyst, Dercon and Van Campenhout (1998)), this instability in the
relationships between markets has been documented.  While the period post-1788 is too27
short to perform a full comparable analysis, we repeated the entire econometric analysis
excluding the data until 1788.  In this period, we continue to find systematic long run
integration (via cointegration tests) for all market pairs, while the lack of systematic fast or
short run integration remains the other main finding.  Inspecting the thresholds, we find a
few changes upwards or downwards, but generally they remain the same.  Repeating the
regressions in Tables 7 to 10 also does not change the conclusions in this paper.
Coefficients remain very similar and one of the core findings, that road building does not
appear to have changed the transactions costs, measured via the threshold, is still valid.
Secondly, the results appear robust to outliers in the left-hand side variables in Tables 9
and 10.  Since the core results from these tables are determinants of estimated variables, it
is possible that poor predictions result in large outliers.  To control for this, very small and
very large values were dropped to retain only about 80 percent of the observations.  No
change in the significance of the results and their interpretation could be detected.  Thirdly,
we tried a few other specifications, including one with interaction terms between roads and
distance, but F-tests on restrictions suggested that the formulation in Tables 9 and 10 could
not be rejected (F(2,146)=1.83 for the thresholds and F(2,146)=1.37 for the adjustment
speed).
7. INTERPRETATION
How can we interpret these findings? In particular, why did transaction costs not decrease
as a result of paved road construction? Several points can be raised.  High margins can be
caused by many different factors.  They could be a reflection of market power of traders.
Indeed, if market power is sufficiently large so that entry is quite impossible, new
infrastructure will not necessarily have a large impact on the profits made by traders.  This
is not a very plausible explanation for this period.  There is no evidence that a few large
traders and their families dominated 18
th century grain trade in the Austrian Low
Countries.  Instead, most records suggest a relatively large number of medium-sized
enterprises.  Consequently, it is unlikely that this large number of traders could effectively
control markets sufficiently without risk of being undercut by competitors (Van Houtte
(1920)).
A more plausible explanation for the sticky nature of transaction costs is the price structure
of the tolls levied on paved roads.  As the tolls varied according to the number of harnessed
horses, bulk transport was discouraged.  Consequently, the use of paved roads remained an28
expensive affair for wheat traders.  Farmers were in very much the same position.  In some
instances farmers even refused to use paved roads and returned to the old dirt roads.  In
those cases the advantage of faster and cheaper transport was apparently more than offset
by the cost of the tolls.  Therefore, the toll issue remained a matter of heated debate during
the whole period under consideration (see e.g. Blondé and Van Uytven (1999)).
Discouraging bulk transport by levying toll on paved roads according to the number of
harnessed horses had at least two important economic effects.  First, it contributed to the
continuing high level of fixed costs relative to variable costs in transport
18
.  Second, it
favoured trade in high-value commodities, more specifically the move of luxury goods
from the ports at the coast towards the east into Liège and the Rhineland.  The intention
was to try to capture some of the high profits Dutch traders were making by this trade (De
Vries and Van der Woude (1997)).  Incentives were therefore created to invest in transport
and trade of high-value commodities.  So, traders were not likely to invest at first in trade
and transport of bulky commodities such as wheat.  Furthermore, there was little scope for
back-loading as well: on the way back from the East, traders would move other high value
goods back, such as wine, rather than cereals.  Consequently, we do not have any evidence
of a large corresponding increase in new private transport capacity for inter-city cereal
trade to capitalise on the better road infrastructure that could have resulted in cost or
margin cutting.
The finding that adjustment speeds increased nevertheless is then interesting.  While
moving grain may not have become cheaper and long-run margins remain unaffected by
roads, we observe that the adjustment speed increased significantly.  In other words, the
main consequence of the road network expansion in the 18
th century was a faster
integration of markets: information and goods flew faster, simple because communication
and transport could use better infrastructure.
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The non-linear relationship in costs means that at relatively large distance, costs are coming down
(table 9).  However, the coefficient on the quadratic term is relatively small, so the reduction is limited.29
8. CONCLUSION
We analyse the integration of wheat markets across 18 towns in the Austrian Low
Countries in the second half of the 18
th century and the relationship with the expansion of a
paved road network in this period.  During this century, the paved road network expanded
fast, resulting in paved road connections between most towns by 1800.  An inspection of
data on wheat prices suggests fairly complicated trading patterns, with periods of either no
trade or trade reversals.  Consequently, we use a switching regression approach (threshold
cointegration) to study long-run and short-run integration of these markets.  We find that
throughout this period, markets were spatially interconnected, presumably through
arbitrage.  However, adjusting price margins after local shocks to long-term levels is
relatively slow and takes about 42 days on average.  We also find relatively high
thresholds, suggesting relatively high transaction costs.  The implication is that in many
periods, no trade takes place between certain towns, while trade flows are likely to have
switched regularly in response to local conditions.
It is widely accepted in Belgian historiography that the construction of a paved road
network caused a substantial reduction in transaction costs.  Our research, however,
indicates that transaction costs are mainly influenced by distance and fixed costs, not by
the expansion of a paved road network.  The price structure of tolls explains to a large
extent the sticky nature of transaction costs.  As the tolls on paved roads varied according
to the number of harnessed horses, bulk transport was discouraged.  Therefore, the
expansion of a paved road network mainly favoured high-value trade, attempting to
capture rents from Dutch trade with Liège and the Rhineland.  New private investment in
inter-city grain trade that may have led to the cutting of price margins and trading costs
typically appears not to have happened in this period.  The main effect of paved road
construction was that the adjustment speed between markets increased.  Clearly, better
communication and faster transport due to the paved road network resulted in faster
arbitrage.30
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ANNEX
Annex Table 1: Results of stationarity tests
Market levels First differences
DF ADF(12) DF ADF(12)
Doornik -0.66 -0.09 -22.75 -5.98
Bergen -0.21 0.14 -9.39 -2.98
Binche -0.27 0.21 -9.00 -3.06
Ath -0.29 0.24 -9.25 -3.08
Charleroi -0.41 0.07 -8.14 -2.34
Namen -0.32 0 -6.70 -2.22
Brussels -0.32 -0.01 -8.24 -3.08
Tienen -0.5 0.12 -5.10 -1.76
Mechelen -0.49 -0.01 -9.29 -3.50
Antwerp -0.25 -0.1 -9.44 -3.40
Lier -0.46 0.17 -7.96 -3.50
St Niklaas -0.51 -0.31 -7.80 -3.04
Ghent -0.51 -0.31 -7.82 -2.81
Brugge -0.38 -0.13 -8.51 -2.82
Veurne -0.69 -0.38 -8.28 -2.42
Ieper -0.54 -0.38 -9.98 -2.26
Kortrijk -0.54 -0.27 -10.93 -4.13
Leuven -0.41 0.19 -25.33 -5.10
H0 of unit root 5 % critical value is –1.95 (Fuller (1976)).
Results imply that all markets are non-stationary in levels, but stationary in differences
(except for Tienen).34
Annex Table 2: cointegration tests in indirectly linked markets
DF ADF(12)
Bergen Doornik -8.89 ** -3.24 **
Brussels Doornik -8.86 ** -3.74 **
Ieper Doornik -8.41 ** -3.79 **
Charleroi Bergen -10.10 ** -4.02 **
Namen Bergen -8.33 ** -3.90 **
Mechelen Bergen -8.30 ** -3.76 **
Antwerp Bergen -7.81 ** -3.75 **
Ghent Bergen -6.66 ** -3.41 **
Ath Binche -9.06 ** -3.00 **
Namen Binche -8.50 ** -4.21 **
Brussels Binche -9.08 ** -4.12 **
Charleroi Ath -9.17 ** -3.55 **
Namen Ath -8.29 ** -3.87 **
Kortrijk Ath -5.89 ** -3.18 **
Leuven Charleroi -13.94 ** -4.05 **
Tienen Brussels -9.09 ** -3.75 **
Antwerpen Brussels -8.41 ** -4.57 **
Brugge Brussels -5.97 ** -3.37 **
Mechelen Tienen -8.42 ** -3.74 **
Lier Mechelen -9.61 ** -3.78 **
Leuven Antwerp -9.80 ** -3.78 **
Leuven Lier -6.73 ** -3.66 **
Brugge St Niklaas -7.02 ** -4.07 **
Veurne Ghent -6.97 ** -4.46 **
Leuven Ghent -7.08 ** -2.78 **
Ieper Veurne -9.55 ** -4.58 **
Kortrijk Veurne -8.35 ** -4.07 **
Note: 1 % critical value is -2.60 (**)
5 % critical value is -1.95 (*)
10 % critical value is –1.61 (+)
Results imply that all market pairs reported are integrated in the long run.35
Annex Table 3 Stationarity of margins of key market pairs
Market Pairs: DF sig ADF(12) Sig
Ath Doornik -7.82 ** -2.92 **
Ghent Doornik -7.79 ** -3.09 **
Kortrijk Doornik -10.19 ** -4.49 **
Binche Bergen -9.41 ** -2.37 *
Ath Bergen -7.21 ** -2.17 *
Brussels Bergen -6.23 ** -1.72 +
Charleroi Binche -7.79 ** -1.65 +
Brussels Ath -7.08 ** -2.89 **
Namen Charleroi -11.39 ** -2.34 *
Brussels Charleroi -9.51 ** -3.18 **
Brussels Namen -7.82 ** -2.68 **
Tienen Namen -6.10 ** -2.34 *
Leuven Namen -9.65 ** -2.94 **
Mechelen Brussels -8.63 ** -4.34 **
Ghent Brussels -4.21 ** -2.25 *
Leuven Brussels -10.56 ** -3.39 **
Leuven Tienen -6.22 ** -1.65 +
Antwerp Mechelen -7.55 ** -3.99 **
Leuven Mechelen -7.84 ** -3.15 **
Lier Antwerp -5.53 ** -2.42 *
St Niklaas Antwerp -7.41 ** -3.23 **
Ghent Antwerp -5.56 ** -1.94 +
Brugge Antwerp -5.17 ** -1.91 +
Ghent St Niklaas -5.43 ** -1.6
Brugge Ghent -6.84 ** -2.37 *
Kortrijk Ghent -6.03 ** -3.01 **
Veurne Brugge -5.21 ** -1.68 +
Ieper Brugge -5.23 ** -2.85 **
Kortrijk Brugge -6.11 ** -2.47 *
Kortrijk Ieper -7.85 ** -2.96 **
Note: 1% critical value is –2.58 (**)
5% critical value is –1.95 (*)
10% critical value is –1.62 (+)
Virtually all the key markets seem to have stationary margins, another way of looking at
long-run integration (i.e. imposing a coefficient of one on the price in the cointegrating
vector), at least at 10 percent.  A model defined in margins appears plausible.36
Annex Table 4 Results of threshold models and tests for short-run integration
Threshold Rho Out t rho out Short run
integration
sig AR1 tAR1 short run
integration
sig
Bergen Doornik 2.80 -0.46 -8.68 ** 10.19 ** -0.35 -8.63 ** 16.40 **
Brussels Doornik 15.00 -1.54 -7.41 ** -2.60 -0.29 -7.81 ** 18.77 **
Ieper Doornik 0.50 -0.34 -8.01 ** 15.55 ** -0.33 -8.33 ** 17.10 **
Charlero Bergen 6.30 -0.42 -7.29 ** 10.07 ** -0.21 -6.49 ** 24.05 **
Namen Bergen 4.80 -0.19 -4.88 ** 20.80 ** -0.13 -4.87 ** 32.97 **
Mechelen Bergen 5.50 -0.37 -6.43 ** 10.95 ** -0.21 -6.31 ** 24.03 **
Antwerp Bergen 3.90 -0.30 -6.01 ** 14.02 ** -0.21 -6.40 ** 24.22 **
Ghent Bergen 13.00 -0.41 -4.72 ** 6.79 ** -0.12 -4.84 ** 34.35 **
Ath Binche 2.28 -0.50 -8.56 ** 8.56 ** -0.38 -9.14 ** 15.00 **
Namen Binche 5.80 -0.33 -6.02 ** 12.22 ** -0.17 -5.80 ** 27.54 **
Brussels Binche 2.50 -0.38 -7.65 ** 12.48 ** -0.29 -7.77 ** 19.44 **
Charlero Ath 10.00 -0.64 -6.66 ** 3.75 ** -0.24 -6.90 ** 22.37 **
Namen Ath 6.50 -0.33 -5.97 ** 12.12 ** -0.16 -5.45 ** 29.47 **
Kortrijk Ath 3.00 -0.24 -6.45 ** 20.43 ** -0.19 -6.25 ** 25.96 **
Leuven Charlero 2.96 -0.91 -12.36 ** 1.22 -0.58 -11.19 ** 8.22 **
Tienen Brussels 17.30 -0.94 -6.26 ** 0.40 -0.12 -4.97 ** 36.01 **
Antwerp Brussels 1.00 -0.37 -7.90 ** 13.45 ** -0.32 -8.30 ** 17.47 **
Brugge Brussels 3.00 -0.15 -4.62 ** 26.18 ** -0.12 -4.66 ** 35.60 **
Mechelen Tienen 20.01 -1.39 -6.74 ** -1.89 -0.10 -4.32 ** 40.96 **
Lier Mechelen 1.21 -0.36 -7.86 ** 13.97 ** -0.31 -8.05 ** 18.20 **
Leuven Antwerp 1.73 -0.56 -9.57 ** 7.52 ** -0.43 -9.18 ** 12.37 **
Leuven Lier 6.01 -0.31 -6.08 ** 13.53 ** -0.15 -4.91 ** 29.00 **
Brugge St Niklaas 1.00 -0.18 -5.76 ** 26.24 ** -0.16 -5.59 ** 28.69 **
Veurne Ghent 3.01 -0.13 -4.64 ** 31.05 ** -0.10 -4.45 ** 38.48 **
Leuven Ghent 8.00 -0.24 -5.47 ** 17.32 ** -0.12 -4.38 ** 33.60 **
Ieper Veurne 1.00 -0.27 -6.97 ** 18.84 ** -0.25 -7.07 ** 21.74 **
Kortrijk Veurne 2.50 -0.34 -7.47 ** 14.50 ** -0.26 -7.31 ** 20.60 **
Results indicate that only four markets appear integrated in the short-run.